Hammorabi is very pessimistic about Iraq. He says the killings and beheadings are widespread and he and his buds are afraid to go out. This is a big turnaround for one of the more positive voices from Iraq. Iraq at a Glance paints a similarly gloomy picture: no gas, no food, and violence. Things ain't good folks and it sure looks like all the guys who called for at least 250,000 troops before the war--- and got fired for saying so--- were right.
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More on: Why is the Army slow to get more armor to Iraq?
Howard,
I think the Army will have better vehicles in Iraq, but the better armor will get there later, just as it happened in WII. The DoD, I think, thought Iraq in 2003 would be like Kosovo in 1999 and thereafter -- more peackeeping than warfighting after the initial shock and awe phase ... The getting ready to fight the last war syndrome all over again.
As far as Mogadishu in 1993 teaching the Army a lesson, it taught the Army this lesson: that maxi-sized M1 tanks and M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles should form the spearpoint of offensive operations in urban terrain. And the Army and USMC have applied this lesson in Falluja and elsewhere Iraq. What they didn't foresee was all these convoy ambushes. ( Neither did I.)
There are four or five other issues at work.
First, the heavy mech part of the Army during the past decade feared that, if the Army bought medium weight wheeled armor such as the Stryker, then that would mean fewer M1 tanks and Bradleys for the Army, and the conversion of some heavy mech divisions into wheeled, medium weight units. Some said the medium weight brigades would be fit only for Balkans-style peackeeping missions.
Also, hardware Strykers got stirred together with the organizational issue of making reinforced brigades instead of the division the Army's basic "units of action."
Result: there has been a lot of foot dragging about getting the 8x8 Stryker and the 4x4 M117 into service.
Third, there was a wheelies versus trackheads fuss about whether the new "Medium Weight" brigades would be equipped with the wheeled Stryker ( a.k.a. the Light Armored Vehicle III ) or a modernized version of the Viet Nam era M113 tracked infantry carrier. You know, the very squared-off and boxy-looking thing. This controversy was sort of a secondary part of the heavy iron versus medium weight controversy.
The basic problem with tracked vehicles, including the mighty M1 Abrams tank, is that they can't keep up with cars and trucks on paved roads. Twenty five or so mph, I would estimate, is a realistic road cruising speed for a big mean-looking tracked war wagon. To quote from a year 1999 piece which is passted below:
"Trackless in Battle
The US Army has decided to solve the problem of getting to trouble spots quickly by dumping many of their tracked vehicles (like the M-1 tank and Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.) Instead, LAVs (Light Armored Vehicles, on wheels instead of tracks) would be used. This is a bold move, but given the increasing number of hot spots in the world, and more frequent U.S. involvement, it makes some sense. But there is a serious downside
....
While the LAV brigades would move around faster on roads, most of the potential battlefields are short on roads. Unless the enemy is lightly armed and timid, the LAV equipped troops are going to take more casualties than if they had tanks.
....."
The much-maligned Carlyle group, by the way, owns a big per cent of United Defense Inc., the firm that currently owns the M113 as well as the canceled Crusader self-propelled 155mm gun. Doesn't seem like Carlyle has that much pull with the Bush Jr. admin. Counterpoint: Rumsfeld's DoD is keeping the Bell Boeing V-22 tiltrotor alive, and Carlyle owns a lot of Bell stock.
Fourth, the issue of armored Hummers or armored trucks got mixed together with women in the Army in an unhelpful way. Again, hardware and personnel issues have been mixed together. Elements of the Army resisted equipping support units such as Jessica Lynch's 139th (?) Ordnance Maintenance Company with up-armored HMMWV's or suchlike because the support units had women in them, women weren't supposed to have combat occupational specialties, and so such units had no need for armored vehicles ... Yes, that logic is kind of circular.
In addition, the Army is also complaining that the USAF could carry more freight by air in Iraq and take some of the pressure off the ground convoys. The Army is also fighting for the right to let the Army operate some cargo aircraft of its own ... Here we have the old issue of: Was it such a good idea to separate the [formerly] Army Air Force from the Army back in 1947?
Here's a couple of clippings. The second clipping, from way back in 1999, gives a feel for the Army's feelings about medium weight wheeled vehicles in that long-ago year.
"... Jumper said the changes followed a recent visit he made to Iraq, where he concluded that Air Force and ground commanders had failed to cooperate effectively on ways to safeguard freight.
"I was not happy with the communication I saw between the air components and the land components about convoy operations," Jumper said. "We have 64 airplanes and they're staying busy. But the question is: Could they be busier? And is 64 enough?"
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-supplies15dec15,1,1317983.story?coll=la-iraq-complete
December 15, 2004 E-mail story Print
U.S. Takes to Air to Move Cargo in Iraq
With the persistent peril of roadside attacks on trucks, more freight is traveling by plane.
...
U.S. Takes to Air to Move Cargo in Iraq
...
By John Hendren, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON — U.S. commanders in Iraq have begun transporting more supplies to the country by aircraft in an effort to evade the roadside bomb attacks that have been killing or wounding about 100 American troops each month, the Air Force's top officer said Tuesday.
Scrambling for other ways to avoid the attacks, the military is also looking into the possibility of bottling and purifying water in Iraq rather than transporting it by truck from Kuwait. Water accounts for 30% of U.S. cargo ferried over Iraq's perilous roadways, officials said.
U.S. forces have been sending about 3,000 vehicles in about 215 convoys in Iraq each day. The vulnerability of trucks, Humvees and other U.S. equipment to roadside bombs has become a major issue amid complaints by troops that the military has been slow to reinforce the vehicles with protective armor.
In the last month, the Air Force has offered extra air freight capacity to take 180 American troops off the road each day, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. Jumper said. Air freighters are now carrying 450 tons of cargo previously carried in convoys, a 30% increase, with a goal of taking on as much as 1,600 tons, Air Force officials said.
Jumper said the changes followed a recent visit he made to Iraq, where he concluded that Air Force and ground commanders had failed to cooperate effectively on ways to safeguard freight.
"I was not happy with the communication I saw between the air components and the land components about convoy operations," Jumper said. "We have 64 airplanes and they're staying busy. But the question is: Could they be busier? And is 64 enough?"
Roadside bombs pose the most lethal threat to American troops in Iraq. About 20 such explosives have erupted in the last month along the main highway from Baghdad's international airport to the capital.
The dangers prompted 23 Army reservists to refuse on Oct. 13 to transport supplies from the Tallil air base near Nasiriya to Taji, north of Baghdad, saying their vehicles lacked armor and were in poor condition. Army officials opted not to court-martial them for refusing orders, imposing minor penalties instead.
Many attacks could be avoided by using aircraft to transport cargo that otherwise would have to be moved along Iraq's most dangerous roads, Jumper said.
Some land routes have already been changed, he said. U.S. military planners also try to keep insurgents guessing by alternating routes and travel times. The Air Force has also begun airlifting newly armored Humvees from Kuwait to Baghdad to avoid the dangerous three- to four-day drive.
Pentagon officials said the number of landing sites for cargo planes probably would expand.
More freight could be diverted with increased use of aging C-130 cargo planes, which are capable of landing on many of the roads that trucks use to make deliveries to troops, Jumper said.
He acknowledged that increased air traffic had its own hazards. "There'll be increased [surface-to-air missile] threats to C-130s, but we've also got 100 casualties a month in convoys."
///////
Back in 1999:
http://www.strategypage.com/search.asp?target=d:\inetpub\strategypageroot\dls\docs1999\battle.htm&search=air%20transport%20us%20army
Trackless in Battle
The US Army has decided to solve the problem of getting to trouble spots quickly by dumping many of their tracked vehicles (like the M-1 tank and Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.) Instead, LAVs (Light Armored Vehicles, on wheels instead of tracks) would be used. This is a bold move, but given the increasing number of hot spots in the world, and more frequent U.S. involvement, it makes some sense. But there is a serious downside. The M-1 tank is the best in the world and is invulnerable to the weapons of most likely opponents. Without the M-1, and the well armed and protected Bradley vehicle, American troops are more vulnerable. This has long been known. During World War II, billions of dollars were spent on forming hundreds of "tank destroyer" battalions. These units were equipped with lightly armored vehicles carrying large guns. The lack of protection proved to be a major liability, and the tank destroyer battalions were all disbanded after the war, never to return.
But many in the army still thought the "lighter, faster" vehicles would be a successful addition to Americas battlefield arsenal. In 1988, such a unit was tried out at the National Training Center (the army's then new laser tag training battlefield.) The light force was stomped by the heavier armor of the enemy. The subject was shelved until recently, when the Chief of Staff of the Army proposed a wholesale adoption of lighter armored vehicles. The reason was because the most likely battles for the army were now in far off hot spots. Speed in getting the troops there was essential, and units with LAVs could get there faster than current ones with tanks and tracked infantry vehicles.
There is little doubt that these new LAV brigades would be at a disadvantage against more heavily equipped opponents. And a lot of potential hotspots contain much cold war era tanks and heavy weapons. Even in Somalia, the rag tag militias had many Soviet 14.5mm heavy machine-guns. These weapons can penetrate the armor of LAVs at 1,000 meters. ( The Stryker/ LAV III is supposed to be withstand 14.5mm at a much closer range. -- DD. ) There are also thousands of Russian made ATGMs out there that can make short work of LAVs are ranges of several thousand meters. And then there are millions of portable rocket launchers that can destroy an LAV at ranges of a hundred meters or so.
While the LAV brigades would move around faster on roads, most of the potential battlefields are short on roads. Unless the enemy is lightly armed and timid, the LAV equipped troops are going to take more casualties than if they had tanks.
There are solutions to these problems. LAV forces have to advance against opposition more carefully. More firepower has to be put on the defender before the LAVs move out in the open. Thus LAVs will advance more slowly and cautiously. You can be bold when your attack is spearheaded by M-1 tanks, but not when LAVs are out front. Ideally, you should have more support from the air force, but the air force has steadily de-emphasized such support over the last decade. Moreover, army troops are always a little nervous when the air force jets are overhead, as the pilots often have an annoying tendency to confuse friendly and enemy vehicles. Without distinctive looking M-1s around to help identify the friendlies, more mistakes are likely. So the army prefers to use it's own artillery and attack helicopters to provide support. This stuff is heavy, but ammo can be moved by civilian air transports.
The big bottleneck is the military airlifters that can carry LAVs, artillery and trucks. But the whole point of the LAV brigades is to get them there as quickly as possible. The air force transports can handle that, although increasingly the shortage of air freighters causes disputes between army and air force over who should go first. The air force believes that if they can get their bomber squadrons overseas first they can chop up any likely opposition before they get close to friendly bases and airfields. As insurance, the air force has increased infantry training for their support people. If air fields are sniped at or threatened by terrorists and guerillas, the air force expects to take care of itself if the army is not around. And the army expects to be out chasing the more heavily armed hostiles, not guarding air fields.
Will the army figure out how to fight light before the new LAV brigades get sent into harm's way? That's a question mark at the moment. The new tactics are still being worked out. Things could get ugly if the air force agrees, but then reneges, on a return to the 1980s "AirLand Battle" tactics they worked out with the army, but gradually abandoned in the 1990s. The army will no doubt prepare for that eventuality, and the current system for commanding forces overseas gives the general in charge the ability to force reluctant army, navy and air force generals to do what he wants. This was shown (although not widely publicized) during Gulf War.
But the test is in the performance. No one can predict exactly how the LAV brigades will perform in combat until there is one. And things could get ugly. ( end quote )
-- david.davenport.1@netzero.com
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